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Empiricism
Eliot went on to write profound religious
verse, still in his trademark modernist style.
'Ash Wednesday' is about both personal
repentance, and Christ as the still point of the
turning world. (Russell Kirk quotes Eliot's
contemporary Rose Macaulay to the effect that
this poem turned many of the rising modernist
generation to Christianity, instead of to
"communism, suggesting that the poem had
an impact as apologetics.)
Eliot wrote short poems on biblical subjects
('Journey of the Magi' and 'Simeon's Song')
and religious dramas (The Rock and Murder in
the Cathedral). The major work of the latter
part of his caree~ was T~e ~our Qu~rtets, a
difficult, challengmg medltatlOn on tIme and
eternity, in which unconventional religious
imagery breaks into a distinctly modern
consciousness.
Eliot's brand of Christianity, an austere
pessimistic strand described as the via negativa, was different in tone from the energetic,
joyful version of C. S. "Lewis. The two men
disliked each other's writing intensely and
disagreed about literature on almost every
point, though, as Lewis said, they agreed
'about matters of such moment [i.e. their
Christian faith] that all literary questions are,
by comparison, trivial'. (For an account of
their ongoing feud, see Dale, T. S. Eliot,
pp. 154-155.) The two perhaps represent two
different ways of making historic Christianity
credible to the contemporary "imagination, or
perhaps ways of reaching two different kinds
of personalities.
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EMPIRICISM
Empiricism (from Gk empeiria, 'experience') is
the important epistemological theory that all
knowledge ultimately comes through experience. David "Hume (1711-76) wielded his

narrow (and unjustifiable) empiricism to the
conclusion that human beings are not able to
know about "causality, substance, minds or
souls, * angels and God. Hume thought humans
could not possibly perceive such things, and
thus can never be said to know them.
How is one to respond to a narrow empiricist like Hume? One should begin by
examining the grounds of the justification for
Humean empiricism. One notes quickly that
empiricism is not self-justifying in that it cannot
validate its own use; for its success depends on
certain human processes working together
somehow to produce mostly true beliefs. But,
as C. S. "Lewis argued, if our thoughts are just
movements among the atoms in our brains, why
think they Are aimed at true belief? Experience
as a source of knowledge is only as good as the
accuracy and design structure of the mechanisms through which the experience occurs. If
our cognitive structures arrived here only
through the mechanisms of "naturalism and
evolution, how could that causal story possibly
account for our cognitive success? One could
never erase the "doubt that one's mind was in
error on any particular belief produced. But for
a properly functioning person, experience does
generate mostly true beliefs. The most plausible
explanation for our cognitive success, therefore,
is design imposed on us from outside. And
so to justify empirical knowledge, it seems
most plausible to approach empiricism from a
theistic background.
It follows that non-theistic empiric isms must
be carefully evaluated, for they usually overstep
their bounds and propose self-defeating principles, or cannot account for the meaningful
knowledge we do have. So, W. K. Clifford
(nineteenth century) recommended that no-one
should ever believe anything not supported by
sufficient evidence (experience). Let us call this
principle 'E'. What is the sufficient evidence
for E? There cannot be sufficient evidence for E.
Thus, it is a philosophical statement going
beyond all available evidence. On Clifford's
empiricism alone, E is self-defeating (it does
not meet its own standard). The downfall
of twentieth-century logical positivism (empiricism) hinged on the same self-defeating
quality. British positivist A. J. Ayer maintained
that a statement is meaningful if, and only if, the
statement is analytic (true by definition alone,
like 'all black dogs are black') or able to be
verified through sense experience. Let us call
this principle 'F'. Is F analytically true? No. Is F
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able to be verified through sense experience?
No. Thus, F is self-defeating and steps beyond
its bounds unjustifiably. Ayer tried to patch
up principle F, leading him to an anaemic
empiricism that left out as meaningless some
things we know to be meaningful, e.g. general
propositions in *science, like 'all ravens are
black', and unrepeatable historical truths.
Among Christian apologists the use of
experience to justify theistic belief is common,
but the types of justification, and where and
when justification takes place within an apologetic system, vary. Evidentialists believe the
truth of Christianity can be established
through the systemization of evidences about
the universe, "morality, consciousness, rationality, design, probabilities for life, and Jesus's
life, death and resurrection. Evidentialists
like Montgomery, McDowell and Habermas
argue that if one applies generally accepted
principles of historiography and textual
criticism to the available evidences, one will
find the weight of probability squarely on the
side of Christian truth. Presuppositionalists
like Van Til are much more concerned with
identifying the basis or conditions for making
sense of experience before one ever asks where
the evidences themselves point regarding
Christianity.
A highly significant modern argument for
God's existence hinges on the cognitive success
of our rationality and our belief-forming
mechanisms. How is it that our beliefs picture
the world rightly, i.e. that our subjective
formation of beliefs usually conforms correctly
and accurately with our objective presence in
this world? C. S. Lewis and Alvin Plantinga
have powerfully argued that "naturalism (the
belief that nature is all there is, thus implying
evolution is entirely responsible for our cognitive apparatus) is not in itself sufficient to
explain the success of the human cognitive
enterprise. As Lewis said, the naturalist finds
himself hoisted on his own petard: in the very
act of explaining that thought is no more than
movements among the 'grey matter', he must
rely on the orderliness and purposiveness of
thought patterns that are clearly aimed at
"truth. The naturalist can only say that
through time, chance, random mutations and
natural selection alone such wonderful structures have been formed and are aimed,
somehow, at producing true beliefs. But on
naturalism and evolution, thoughts are simply
movements of atoms or something caused by
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those movements, e.g. epiphenomenal happenings in the brain. There is no factor from
outside this naturalistic picture to ensure that
our internal cognitive structures map correctly
to the external world and thus would produce
true beliefs about that world (as opposed
merely to help us display danger-avoidance
behaviour for survival). But, according to
Plantinga, *theism has an answer. God creates
us in his image, part of which means to be
rational persons with cognitive mechanisms
producing mostly true beliefs when in the
suitable environment.
In many ways, we would know nothing
without our experience. Plantinga states that
there is even an empirical or phenomenal
aspect to our knowledge of necessary and
abstract truthS-such as mathematics and "logic.
However;"Wondering whether our experience
produces justified belief, i.e. wondering whether
our experience is at base reliable, has an objective and a significant subjective component.
Objectively, either it is largely reliable or it is
not. If it is not largely reliable, then there is no
way out of this predicament. It appears to be
largely reliable, and to act otherwise in the
community setting is to betray the very assuredness experience gives us. For example, to think
it possible that my son is not of human descent,
and that he is older than his father, in the
ordinary meaning of those terms, is incredible
and philosophically untenable, but in some
broadly logical sense possible. But the subjective side of the issue intersects at this point with
the objective: I am as sure as a knower of most
truths I can name that I have a son, and that my
son is younger than I am by virtue of my evident
and undeniable experiences (e.g. seeing him
being born and watching him mature ever since
on more or less a daily basis). There is a
temporal and spatial continuity to this event of
seeing and knowing my son that is objectively
and subjectively undeniable. And it was
evidently designed that there would be no other
reasonable way for me to know these facts than
through experience and reflection. There are
many conditions for such knowledge (memory,
consciousness, reflection, etc.). That these
conditions could be doubted, individually or
severally, is true, but that it is rational to doubt
their truth-conduciveness is not true.
Thus, our attitude as Christians towards the
truth of the deliverances of our senses should
be thanksgiving. We receive it as an evident gift
from God the creator and designer of our
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senses. God has so designed us that through
experience we come to know his world and the
things necessary for salvation and life with
him. Thomas "Reid remarks that all of the
objective components that contribute to our
knowing come out of the same shop, i.e. there
is an integrity or wholeness in the mechanisms
of human cognition that is admirable and
wondrous.
It is acceptable to maintain that our considered Christian " epistemology must combine
elements of "rationalism and empiricism. In
Critique of Pure Reason Immanuel "Kant was
right when he said that concepts without
experiences are empty (useless), and experiences without concepts are blind (undirected).
God has so ordered our minds to make sense
of our experience. The process of God getting
his propositional "revelation to us is largely
empirical (transmission of the text, the act of
reading). Clearly, however, there are Christian
sources of rational beliefs not fully traceable
back to experience taken alone (the act of
inspiration of Scripture, the act of regeneration, the internal testimony of the *Holy
Spirit, mystical experience, "miracles, sense of
the divine love, near-death experiences), since
God himself is a nonphysical spirit. Even if we
look at human epistemology naturalistically
(e.g. through the notion of proper function,
following Plantinga), it is reasonable to believe
that experience is a reliable and justified source
of knowledge only if it flowers within a supernaturalistic " meta physics.
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ENLIGHTENMENT, THE
Like many labels for periods of history, 'the
Enlightenment' was introduced by historians
to express an estimation of the value of what
they identify as an 'era'. Like the term 'Renaissance', but unlike the 'Middle Ages' or the
'Dark Ages', 'the Enlightenment' has stood for
a movement in thought and culture that some
modern historians have looked upon favour-

ably. They did so because this movement
challenged the "authority of religious tradition
and celebrated the value, goodness and virtues
of human nature, looking to modern "science
to secure human progress over ignorance and
superstition. The Enlightenment is often delimited from the late 1600s to the end of the
1700s, but there is no universally accepted
way to date the period. The closest one can
come to a historical summary of Enlightenment thought is Immanuel "Kant's (17241804) dictum that 'Enlightenment is man's
emergence from his self-imposed immaturity.
Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding without guidance from another. This
immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies
not in lac!s. of understanding, but in lack of
resolve and courage to use it without guidance
from.-another. Sapere Aude! Have courage to
use your own understanding! That is the motto
of enlightenment' (Kant, p. 85).
In addition to Kant, key figures who are
often seen as champions of the Enlightenment
include Michel de Montaigne (1533-92), John
"Locke (1632-1704), Baron de Montesquieu
(1689-1755), Fran\=ois Marie Arouet de
*Voltaire (1694-1778), David "Hume (171176), Denis Diderot (1713-84), Adam Smith
(1723-90), and Baron de Holbach (1723-89).
Sometimes, Rene "Descartes (1596-1650),
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Benedict de
"Spinoza (1632-77) are included as members
of this group. Many of these thinkers may be
seen from today's perspective as having truly
made an enduring, positive impact on European
culture and beyond. Certainly their opposition to religious intolerance and persecution
is significant and the pursuit of intellectual
freedom by opposing excessive censorship
is important. Moreover, the Enlightenment
ushered in a level of critical reflection on religion
which produced masterpieces in both the case
for and the case against religious belief. Of the
figures named, Locke articulated and defended
a vital role for Christianity in culture and
politics; Holbach and Diderot wrote polemics
against religion, as did Voltaire, though
Voltaire's work was often more anti-clerical
than anti-theistic. Enlightenment thinkers like
Voltaire commended a natural religion that
recognized God and an afterlife but shunned
special providence, scriptural authority and
"miracles. Hume and Kant delivered systematic
critical treatments of the classical theistic arguments, though Hume may be interpreted as a
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